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The impact of corporate disclosure on capital mar-
kets has been discussed for decades–and the interest 
has not decreased over time. Lev and Ohlson (1982: 
249) stated in their review of research in the field: 
“A decade and a half of the most concerted and am-
bitious research effort in accounting history is eva-
luated here”. Even today neither capital market 
implications nor other consequences of corporate 
disclosure have been fully explored or understood. 
Corporate disclosure is intended to provide infor-
mation on the operating activities, and the financial 
and business situation of a firm to an interested 
audience. Firms’ disclosure is therefore not limited 
to financial information, but also addresses a great 
variety of non-financial information. 
It is undisputed that corporate disclosure increases 
the amount of information available to addressees. 
This information effect is only a means to an end 
and firms will hardly provide information out of 
philanthropic motives. In fact, it is purely economic 
reasoning that drives disclosure of corporate infor-
mation. In a related vein Dye (2001) noted that 
capital market impacts of disclosure are in the spot-
light while implications for merchandise markets 
are of peripheral interest. Prior research mainly 
discussed the relation between disclosure and an 
increase in wealth of shareholders, but also evalu-
ated other market consequences of disclosure. 
Following Healy and Palepu (2001) two types of 
disclosure consequences exist: (1) the liquidity of 
markets and individual securities and (2) the cost of 
capital to firms. Most prior studies investigated the 
implications of annual report disclosure on capital 
markets outside Germany or relied on specific, nar-
row proxies for disclosure with questionable validity 
(e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Leuz 2003). I 
therefore examine these relations in the German 
capital market in 2006 using the innovative Artifi-
cial Intelligence Measurement of Disclosure (AIMD) 
that directly derives disclosure measures from an-
nual reports. 
Capital-market-related research mainly addresses 
voluntary disclosure as from a mandatory disclosure 
that does not vary between firms (of a certain indus-
try, size and exchange segment) no firm-specific 
endogenous market reactions can be expected. A 
research design to address the mandatory disclosure 
issue must be either normative or requires sufficient 
variance in mandatory disclosure levels that can 
often be found in international samples only. In line 
with, e.g., Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008), Langberg 
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and Sivaramakrishnan (2010), and Zechman (2010) 
I therefore disregard mandatory disclosure implica-
tions but focus on firm-specific disclosure conse-
quences. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In 
section two the relations between disclosure and 
liquidity aspects are discussed. Section three looks 
at disclosure from a cost-of-capital perspective. The 
research design for the empirical evaluation of the 
four hypotheses developed in sections two and three 
is described in section four. Section five reports the 
results of the empirical investigation. Finally, sec-
tion six summarizes the findings. 
2 Liquidity Hypotheses 
Development 
Different aspects of liquidity exist. On the one hand 
share turnover measures the overall trading activity. 
On the other hand the bid-ask spread also addresses 
liquidity issues as the friction that burdens traders. 
2.1 Trading activity 
Trading activity (i.e. share turnover) is an obvious 
measure for market liquidity as liquidity increases 
with more liquid funds used to buy securities. 
The market price balances different individual ex-
pectations and reflects the consensus expectations 
of all market participants while changing consensus 
expectations imply changes in market prices (Elton, 
Gruber, and Gultekin 1981, Karpoff 1987, Ryan and 
Taffler 2004, and Ryan 2005). Consensus expecta-
tions only change, however, if the individual expec-
tations of some investors change and they adjust 
their portfolios by buying or selling securities. 
Changes in individual expectations therefore induce 
share turnover. 
Individual expectations are co-determined by the 
level of information that is available to the respec-
tive market participant. Roll (1988) identified three 
different factors to influence capital market partici-
pants’ expectations: (1) common macroeconomic 
knowledge, (2) industry-specific information, and 
(3) firm-specific information. All of them could 
potentially be addressed by corporate disclosure. If 
disclosure provides information that is new to some 
investors their individual expectations change. As a 
result, portfolios need to be adjusted and share 
turnover occurs. This effect not only exists if the 
information is new to some investors, but also if 
certain market participants interpret available in-
formation differently against the background of the 
new information (Karpoff 1986, Kim and Verrecchia 
1991). 
Prior empirical research revealed a strong and sus-
tainable impact on trading activity for various dis-
closure instruments. The influence of earnings an-
nouncements on share turnover is very well docu-
mented. In the 1960s empirical studies started to 
report an increasing share turnover in connection 
with earnings announcements (e.g., Beaver 1968). 
Multiple papers followed to examine this relation-
ship based on larger samples, more advanced em-
pirical methods, and in different capital markets 
(e.g., Morse 1981, Bamber 1986, Sivakumar and 
Waymire 1994). They consistently showed a positive 
effect of disclosure on share turnover. On the other 
hand, laboratory experiments fail to reproduce a 
turnover increase following an earnings announce-
ment in simulated markets (Gillette, Stevens, Watts, 
and Williams 1999). 
Share turnover is also influenced by other types of 
information that could be provided by corporate 
disclosure, including macroeconomic data 
(McGuinness 1999), social responsibility disclosure 
(Patten 1990), and ad-hoc information disclosure 
(Ryan and Taffler 2004, Muntermann and Guettler 
2007). Based on the idea that the information con-
tent of annual reports decreases with increasing 
temporal distance to the accounting year end, the 
positive relation between timeliness of disclosure 
and share turnover demonstrated by Leventis and 
Weetman (2004) can also be interpreted as evi-
dence for a positive association of disclosure and 
trading activity. Furthermore, Bailey, Li, Mao, and 
Zhong (2003) and Francis, Nanda, and Wang 
(2006) reported an increase in share turnover fol-
lowing increased non-discrimination disclosure 
requirements of U.S. regulation F-D. 
A different stream of literature discusses a negative 
relation between corporate disclosure and share 
turnover under certain conditions. Share turnover 
increases with increasing uncertainty of investors 
and a greater variance in individual expectations 
(Barron 1995, Bamber, Barron, and Stober 1997, 
Bamber, Barron, and Stober 1999, Linsmeier, 
Thornton, Venkatachalam, and Welker 2002). The 
higher the variance of individual expectations the 
higher the information advantage of informed in-
vestors that must be transformed into real economic 
benefits by market transactions–causing share turn-
over. With higher information asymmetry therefore 
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more insider transactions occur. Corporate disclo-
sure is expected to reduce information asymmetry 
and hence reduce insider transactions and trading 
activities. Eventually, the negative effect of corpo-
rate disclosure is based on the assumption that a 
considerable proportion of all stock market transac-
tions are insider transactions and their decrease 
cannot be compensated by additional transactions 
of previously uninformed investors. 
Altogether, the idea that corporate disclosure devel-
ops to an extent where information asymmetry 
vanishes and previously informed investors leave 
the market, whereas the decrease in informed 
transactions cannot be compensated by an increase 
in share turnover from other (now better informed) 
investors seems to be implausible. In line with the 
first stream of literature an increasing share turn-
over with an increasing information provision by 
corporate disclosure is therefore hypothesized. 
H1: Corporate disclosure and share turnover are 
positively associated. 
2.2 Bid-Ask Spread 
Information asymmetry reduces, i.e. information 
levels of market participants are more even, if (1) 
information that has been private is made public or 
(2) disclosure provides information that is entirely 
new to the market (and the relative proportion of 
public information increases to the disadvantage of 
private information). 
In this respect two different views on how informa-
tion asymmetry reduction affects the bid-ask spread 
are discussed in the literature. On the one hand, a 
lower information asymmetry reduces the risk of 
passive traders to lose against better informed active 
traders. As passive traders compete the actual 
spread reduces accordingly. Bloomfield and O’Hara 
(1999) reproduced this competitive effect in a labo-
ratory setting. On the other hand, a lower spread 
makes the price-offering service of passive traders 
less attractive as the risk and the resulting compen-
sation provided by active traders are lower (Dia-
mond and Verrecchia 1991). Consequently, passive 
traders exit the market and market liquidity de-
creases. With lower information asymmetry unin-
formed traders may also become more aware of 
being uninformed and leave the market. Altogether, 
liquidity decreases and the spread increases (Wu 
and Zhang 2002). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
argued that the effect of a spread reduction due to 
reduced risk outweighs the contrary impact of a 
spread increase due to trader exits. A negative rela-
tion between corporate disclosure and bid-ask 
spread is therefore expected. 
In contrast to main stream literature some papers 
predict a positive association of disclosure and in-
formation asymmetry. McNichols and Trueman 
(1994) argued that market participants respond to 
disclosure with a varying motivation to search for 
additional information, i.e. to reduce information 
asymmetry on their own. Verrecchia (1982), Dia-
mond (1985), and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) as-
sumed that market participants differ in their in-
formation-processing capabilities and therefore 
information asymmetry increases if more informa-
tion is available. 
Various empirical evidence supports a negative 
association of disclosure and spread. Early papers 
relied on a contingency approach where certain firm 
characteristics are expected to accompany higher 
information asymmetry. For instance, a high pro-
portion of insiders holding stocks, a high proportion 
of institutional investors and a large influence of 
principal shareholders–that are all considered to 
accompany high information asymmetry–imply a 
high spread (e.g., Chiang and Venkatesh 1988, Hef-
lin and Shaw 2000). Later studies directly ad-
dressed the relation between corporate disclosure, 
information asymmetry, and spread. For instance, 
Welker (1995), Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999), 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Brockman and Chung 
(2001), Heflin, Shaw, and Wild (2005), and Attig, 
Fong, Gadhoum, and Lang (2006) provided evi-
dence that firms’ voluntary disclosure policy is nega-
tively associated with spreads. The spread is also 
reducing with the disclosure of particular informa-
tion, including the disclosure of explored and unex-
plored oil reserves (Raman and Tripathy 1993, 
Boone 1998, Boone, Luther, and Raman 1998), 
segmental reporting information (Greenstein and 
Sami 1994), and management forecasts of quarterly 
earnings (Coller and Yohn 1997). However, the dis-
closure effect on the spread seems to depend on the 
type of information (Guo, Lev, and Zhou 2004). 
In summary, previous theoretical as well as empiri-
cal work suggests the following hypothesis. 
H2: Corporate disclosure and the bid-ask spread 
are negatively associated. 
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3 Equity Cost Hypothesis 
Development 
The expected reduction of equity cost is probably 
the most important motive for firms to disclose 
information (Choi 1973, Cooke 1993, Verrecchia 
2001, Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007). The 
basic idea of the cost reduction effect is twofold 
(Core 2001): First, comprehensive disclosure re-
duces investors’ information uncertainty as dis-
cussed in the previous section. Second, if informa-
tion asymmetry decreases, investors require a lower 
risk premium (Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva 2006), i.e. 
cost of capital reduces. 
Two main streams of literature exist that examine 
the relation of cost of capital and corporate disclo-
sure in detail. On the one hand, information asym-
metry is considered to drive capital cost as investors 
require compensation for higher transaction costs 
that result from higher bid-ask spreads (Amihud 
and Mendelson 1986, Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie 
2004). In line with the negative relation between 
disclosure and information asymmetry cost of capi-
tal reduces with an increasing disclosure level. On 
the other hand, corporate disclosure influences the 
non-diversifiable prognosis risk for unknown re-
turns (Klein and Bawa 1976, Coles, Loewenstein, 
and Suay 1995, Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson 
1996). Here, investors are assumed to decide based 
on uncertain returns while the precise distribution 
is unknown and distribution parameters are esti-
mated from past experience and other available 
information. Uncertain returns are modeled using 
estimators for the distribution function parameters 
that depend on an investor’s level of information. As 
the prognosis risk is non-diversifiable it affects cost 
of capital but is not considered in popular capital 
market models (Botosan 2006). 
A number of approaches are discussed in the litera-
ture to quantify the cost of capital concept empiri-
cally. 
3.1 Investors’ Return Requirements 
Cost of equity is opportunity cost of alternative in-
vestment opportunities (e.g., Shapiro 1978, Kerins, 
Smith, and Smith 2004, Indjejikian 2007) and 
equals the rate of return investors require to hold 
stocks of a firm. Easley and O’Hara (2004) regarded 
an imperfect capital market where differently in-
formed investors with rational expectations hold 
risky securities. The overall amount of information 
is separated into public and private, i.e. information 
asymmetry is proportional to the percentage of 
private information. Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
concluded that in equilibrium firms with lower in-
formation asymmetry are ceteris-paribus con-
fronted with lower return expectations of their in-
vestors. Corporate disclosure is introduced into the 
model and increases the number of investors that 
have access to private information or reduces the 
amount of private information for the benefit of 
public information. Both effects reduce the required 
rate of return and decrease firms’ capital cost ac-
cordingly. In their empirical study Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) reported an increase 
in returns with higher information asymmetry. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated. 
H3: Corporate disclosure and cost of capital are 
negatively associated. 
3.2 Other direct measures for cost of 
capital 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 
1964, Lintner 1965, Mossin 1966) is inappropriate 
because of the following theoretical concerns. None 
of the mechanisms discussed in section two, neither 
the transaction-cost-based nor the information-
based one, can be modeled within the CAPM. While 
the first is incompatible with the imputed fric-
tionless capital market, the latter is incompatible 
with the assumption of well-known distribution 
functions of all relevant market parameters. Accord-
ingly, the CAPM does not leave room for effects of 
information asymmetry and corporate disclosure 
because of the assumed high information efficiency 
and identical expectations of all market participants 
(Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 2002). A descriptive 
analysis (available from the BuR – Business Re-
search website) reveals no association of disclosure 
and the beta for the German sample used in sections 
four and five. Similarly there is no room for the 
transaction-cost-based as well as the prognosis-risk-
related impact of corporate disclosure on capital 
cost within the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
(Lehmann and Modest 1988, Fama and French 
1996) framework (Easley and O’Hara 2004). I can-
not apply expected income discounting methods 
(e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 2001, Boto-
san and Plumlee 2002) as no IBES prognoses data 
could be obtained for the sample. Cost of capital can 
also not be measured by the direct welfare loss of a 
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(1)  market value = equityt + 

 = 1
 E(earningst+  – r · equityt+–1) / (1+r) 
capital-raising firm, i.e. the underpricing when issu-
ing secu
ck 1986, Beatty and Ritter 1986) as 
a considerable amount of the underpricing is not 
driven by information asymmetry, but results from 
non-rational decisions and principal-agent prob-
lems (Ritter and Welch 2002). Furthermore, most 
sample firms do not have IPOs within the time pe-
riod under review. 
Aside from the above capital cost concepts other 
approaches are also infrequently used to evaluate 
the relation between corporate disclosure and cost 
of capital empirically–and provide mixed evidence. 
Some reveal an unconditioned capital cost reduction 
because of disclosure (Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005, 
Cheng, Collins, and Huang 2006, Eaton, Nofsinger, 
and Weaver 2007, Black, Carnes, Jandik, and Hen-
derson 2007), some document a relation that de-
pends on the kind of information (Richardson and 
Welker 2001), and some a relation that depends on 
how the information is disclosed (Botosan and 
Plumlee 2002). 
3.3 Market Value 
Maximizing market value is a means to an end of 
reducing cost of equity. As market value is the future 
expected cash flows from the firm to its investors 
discounted with the equity cost rate, with a lower 
equity cost rate the market value increases. Within 
short periods of time the number of shares issued 
can be considered to be constant. Market value and 
share price therefore contain similar information 
with respect to disclosure effects. 
Many papers regarded “value relevance”, i.e. a posi-
tive influence of corporate disclosure on a firm’s 
market value as the ultimate aim of disclosure (e.g., 
Hughes 2000, Espahbodi, Espahbodi, Rezaee, and 
Tehranian 2002, Young and Guenther 2003, abac, 
Scott, and Wier 2005, Bowen, Davis, and Matsu-
moto 2005). 
To analyze this effect accounting information and 
market capitalization can be linked through abnor-
mal returns. For an indefinite period of time a firm’s 
market value is the sum of all discounted future 
cash payments to investors (Peasnell 1982, Feltham 
and Ohlson 1995, Bernard 1995). The Ohlson and 
Feltham framework allows a firm’s market value to 
be approximated using earnings prognoses and 
equity book values if the clean-surplus condition is 
fulfilled. It requires that all changes in the equity 
book value that do not result from transactions with 
investors are recognized in the income statement. 
Hence, equityt = equityt–1 + earningst + dividendst 
(Ohlson 1995, Feltham and Ohlson 1995) and mar-
ket capitalization of equity can be restated as 
where r is the risk-free interest rate (Lundholm 
1995). In addition to equity book values the formula 
only contains expected values of future abnormal 
returns above a risk-free equity return. Bernard 
(1995) concluded from his analysis of the U.S. capi-
tal market that valid estimates can be obtained us-
ing a short forecasting horizon of only T = 4 periods. 
Any conceivable mandatory disclosure includes the 
equity book value for the reporting period. Further 
mandatory or voluntary disclosure should therefore 
provide information that is useful to estimate ab-
normal returns. While dividend prognoses are also 
influenced by investors’ decision on whether to dis-
tribute or retain profits, abnormal earnings can be 
forecast using information about operating activities 
and the financial and business situation of a firm 
only. 
Still, the above arguments and economic intuition 
do not allow to predict the direction of the relation, 
i.e. whether there is a proportional or inversely pro-
portional relationship. Corporate disclosure can 
either contain “good” or “bad” news, i.e. increase or 
reduce market expectations of abnormal returns. 
Considering the “good news bias” that is well docu-
mented in the literature (e.g., Clarkson, Kao, and 
Richardson 1994, Karamanou and Vafeas 2005) I 
hypothesize a positive relation between disclosure 
and a firm’s market value. 
Similarly, differences between accounting stan-
dards’ and markets’ perceptions can be explained by 
assets and liabilities. It is well known that changes 
in accounting standards induce price reactions at 
the capital market (Dyckman and Smith 1979, Col-
lins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal 1981, Healy and Palepu 
2001). Disclosure is an instrument to bridge the gap 
between market perceptions and accounting stan-
dards by providing further information about the 
value of assets and liabilities (Robinson and Lucas 
2007). On the one hand, differences between mar-
ket values and accounting values result as the bal-
ance sheet does not recognize certain assets and 
liabilities at market price. Market and book values of 
equity differ as a consequence. On the other hand, 
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what is perceived as an asset differs between an 
accounting standard and the market. Although cer-
tain intangibles are not recognized in the balance 
sheet they are valued by the market and co-
determine a firm’s market value. Accordingly, mar-
ket value can also be explained by varying recogni-
tion of assets/liabilities following accounting stan-
dards and market perceptions. 
Often book values do not exceed market values of 
assets while the reverse is true for liabilities. Fur-
thermore, the value of intangible assets considera-
bly exceeds that of intangible liabilities. The book 
value of total equity is therefore lower than market 
capitalization. As intangible assets are much more 
important for firms than intangible liabilities I will 
restrict myself to the former. A difference between 
market capitalization and equity book values may 
result because (1) valuation differences between 
accounting standards and the market are small, (2) 
the firm has few, low-value intangible assets, and (3) 
the firm has difficulties in explaining the inherent 
value of intangible assets to the capital market 
(Beattie and Thomson 2005). The first effect only 
relates to mandatory disclosure that is not ad-
dressed here as discussed in the introduction. The 
second effect is not linked to disclosure, but the 
third can easily be influenced by a firm’s disclosure 
policy. Given the bias of disclosure towards “good 
news” market value should increase following dis-
closure. 
Empirical papers researching the topic often rely on 
multiple regression models with market capitaliza-
tion as the dependent, certain disclosure measures 
as independent, and controls for items that are not 
(or not at market values) recognized in the balance 
sheet, e.g., equity book values, total assets and li-
abilities. They overwhelmingly support a positive 
relation between disclosure and market capitaliza-
tion (e.g., Landsman 1986, Barth 1991, Healy, 
Hutton, and Palepu 1999, Ritter and Welch 2002). 
Contradictory, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) 
failed to reproduce a relation between disclosure 
level and market capitalization. 
Summarizing, based on theory and empirical evi-
dence I hypothesize the following. 
H4: Corporate disclosure and market capitaliza-
tion are positively associated. 
4 Research Design 
This section documents the empirical design to 
evaluate the four hypotheses from the preceding 
sections. 
4.1 Regression Models 
First I establish the regression models. In addition 
to corporate disclosure a number of control vari-
ables used in previous studies are included to ascer-
tain the explanatory power of disclosure for the 
respective dependent variable. 
4.1.1. Trading Activity 
Prior empirical studies suggested that a number of 
parameters besides corporate disclosure affect trad-
ing activity. In line with Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
I use the free float that measures shareholder con-
centration as a control for trading activity. Empirical 
evidence of whether firm size is associated with 
share turnover is mixed. Some studies find a nega-
tive association of firm size and share turnover (e.g., 
Tkac 1999); some a positive (e.g., Bessembinder, 
Chan, and Seguin 1996, Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). 
The positive relation between price volatility and 
share turnover is well documented in the empirical 
literature (see the review of Bessembinder and Se-
guin 1993). Membership to stock exchange seg-
ments may also influence share turnover (Tkac 
1999) as inclusion into major stock exchange indices 
is found to increase trading activity (Shleifer 1986, 
Harris and Gurel 1986, Vijh 1994, Beneish and 
Whaley 1996, Lynch and Mendenhall 1997). Other 
studies documented increasing trading activities for 
cross-listed firms (e.g., Bancel and Mittoo 2001 and 
the overview at Karolyi 1998). 
Therefore, I evaluate H1 using the following multi-
ple regression equation. 
(2) SHARE_TURNOVER = a0 +  
a1 · DISCLOSURE + a2 · FREEFLOAT + a3 · 
SIZE + a4 · VOLATILITY + a5 · EXCHANGE_ 
SEGMENT + a6 · CROSSLISTING + . 
4.1.2. Bid-Ask Spread 
Prior research developed various approaches to 
measuring spreads. Following Stoll (2000) I here 
use the proportional quoted half-spread defined 
as (ask price – bid price) / (2 · closing price) as all 
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required information is easily available. I measure 
this spread as the annual average based on daily ask, 
bid, and closing prices. The proportional quoted 
half-spread does not allow to separate the transac-
tion-cost-based from information-based spread 
components (Glosten and Harris 1988). These two 
components cannot be separated here because in-
formation about each single trade within a certain 
period of time is not available. 
However, I argue that the approximation error is 
acceptable as the transaction-cost spread compo-
nent is low relative to the information-based on the 
Deutsche Börse. Between the mid-1980s and 1995 
the proportion of the information-based spread on 
the NYSE increased from 43 percent to between 47 
and 54 percent (Stoll 1989, Menyah and Paudyal 
2000). Transaction costs further decrease with in-
creasing electronic trading (Weber 2006) and the 
spread is more sensitive to incoming new informa-
tion in electronic trading systems compared to floor 
trading (Aitken, Frino, Hill, and Jarnecic 2004). In 
2006 about 92 percent of all trades on the Deutsche 
Börse were processed using the electronic Xetra 
system. Therefore, the information-based spread is 
supposed to be considerably larger than the transac-
tion-cost-based spread and the approximation error 
is acceptable. Furthermore, for the regression analy-
sis the total level of the transaction-cost spread is 
irrelevant as long as it is identical for all securities. 
This is most likely true for order processing cost, but 
not for inventory cost that varies with the risk of an 
individual security. However, inventory cost con-
tributes to the total spread only marginally (Stoll 
1989). 
I consider a number of control variables when eva-
luating the relation between corporate disclosure 
and the spread. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
spread increases with large, especially institutional 
investors as they tend to have insider knowledge 
(e.g., Chiang and Venkatesh 1988, Leuz 2003). The 
analyst following has a depressant effect on the 
spread (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995, 
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), but no data are avail-
able for the German capital market, unfortunately. 
Stock exchange turnover as a measure of trading ac-
tivity, the closing price, and market capitalization 
also inhibit the spread (e.g., Lev 1988, Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000, Stoll 2000, Brockman and Chung 
2003, Leuz 2003, Heflin, Shaw, and Wild 2005, 
Chang, Chen, Liao, and Mishra 2006). I do not con-
sider the closing price and market capitalization as 
additional controls because the proportional quoted 
half-spread already accounts for the closing price 
and market value information beyond firm size. 
Prior research found higher spreads with higher 
volatility of prices (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, 
Stoll 2000, Leuz 2003, Heflin, Shaw, and Wild 
2005) and lower spreads for larger firms (e.g., Leuz 
and Verrecchia 2000, Leuz 2003, Heflin, Shaw, and 
Wild 2005, Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan 2007). 
I use the following multiple regression equation to 
evaluate H2. 
(3) SPREAD = a0 + a1 · DISCLOSURE + a2 · 
FREEFLOAT + a3 · SIZE + a4 · SHARE_ 
TURNOVER + a5 · VOLATILITY + . 
4.1.3. Investors’ Return Requirements 
Return expectations, i.e. ex-ante returns of securi-
ties are not easy to measure from an empirical per-
spective. Following Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper (2004) I therefore use ex-post returns 
measured as annual average of ex-post daily stock 
return deviations from the industry average. This 
deviation also controls for industry effects. In line 
with Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) I use 
firm size as a control variable in addition to industry 
and the following multiple regression equation re-
sults for H3. 
(4) ABNORMAL_RETURN = a0 +  
a1 · DISCLOSURE + a2 · SIZE + . 
4.1.4. Market Capitalization 
Accounting information is not completely value 
irrelevant. Therefore, I control for book value of 
equity in line with Hughes (2000) and Bowen, Da-
vis, and Rajgopal (2002). Following Bowen, Davis, 
and Rajgopal (2002) I also control for other firm 
size effects using an additional size measure. In line 
with Abdolmohammadi (2005) I also use abnormal 
returns beyond the industry average as a control 
variable, although no significant influence was do-
cumented in prior research. Altogether the following 
multiple regression equation results for H4. 
(5) MARKET_VALUE = a0 + a1 · DISCLOSURE + 
a2 · COMMON_EQUITY + a3 · SIZE + a4 · 
ABNORMAL_RETURN + . 
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4.2 Empirical Measures 
This section documents the measures used for test-
ing the models set up in section 4.1. 
4.2.1. Proxies for Corporate Disclosure 
Previous studies used a wide variety of methods to 
measure corporate disclosure, including the popular 
rating provided by the Association for Investment 
and Management (AIMR) (e.g., Lang and Lund-
holm 1993, 1996, Welker 1995, Sengupta 1998, Hea-
ly, Hutton, and Palepu 1999, Bushee and Noe 2000, 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002, Lundholm and Myers 
2002), scores from the Center for International 
Financial Analysis & Research (CIFAR) (e.g., Carlin 
and Mayer 2003, Hope 2003, Bushee 2004, Bush-
man, Piotroski, and Smith 2004, Francis, Khurana, 
and Pereira 2005), Standard & Poor’s Scoring (e.g., 
Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan 2004, Durnev and 
Kim 2005, Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan 2007, 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007), and scores derived 
from manual, proprietary text analysis. No raw data 
are available for the German sample. 
Therefore, I derive disclosure measures from firms’ 
annual reports using the Artificial Intelligence Mea-
surement of Disclosure (AIMD) (Grüning 2011). It 
measures disclosure in ten distinctive information 
dimensions (financial information, information 
about customers, information about the value chain, 
information about employees, information about 
R&D, information about corporate strategy, infor-
mation about corporate governance, information 
about the stock market, and information about so-
cial and environmental responsibility). Appendix A 
provides further details about AIMD. 
For the empirical analysis I aggregate the AIMD 
measures for the ten disclosure dimensions (DIS-
CLOSURE_01 … DISCLOSURE_10) using factor 
analysis. Based on a KMO of 0.928 and one eigen-
value above one (8.123) a single factor (DISCLO-
SURE) is extracted. 
4.2.2. Other measures 
The remaining variables are taken from either Data-
stream Worldscope or the Hoppenstedt Firmen-
datenbank, depending on information availability 
and sample coverage.  
Following Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2004) I proxy abnormal returns beyond the indus-
try average (ABNORMAL_RETURN) by the 2006 
annual average of daily abnormal stock returns 
against the industry average using four industry 
groups described in Table 1. Daily stock returns are 
obtained from Datastream Worldscope. Equity book 
values (COMMON_EQUITY) are measured by the 
2006 book value of total equity obtained from Hop-
penstedt. In line with Archambault and Archam-
bault (2003) CROSSLISTING is the number of 
countries a firm is listed outside Germany based on 
the Datastream list of stock exchanges. EX-
CHANGE_SEGMENT distinguishes between firms 
listed in the Prime (coding 1) and General Standard 
(coding 2) based on Deutsche Börse information. 
The percentage of shares not hold by strategic inves-
tors (FREEFLOAT) measures shareholder concen-
tration in line with Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). 
Data are obtained from the Deutsche Börse Weight-
ing Files. MARKET_VALUE is the market value of 
the firm obtained from Datastream. Trading activity 
is measured as the turnover of shares 
(SHARE_TURNOVER) in 2006 obtained from 
Datastream. Following Hagerman and Zmijewski 
(1979) and Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, and Schip-
per (2006), SIZE is measured as the natural loga-
rithm of total sales of the firm in 2006 obtained 
from Hoppenstedt. In line with Stoll (2000) infor-
mation asymmetry is measured by the annual aver-
age of daily proportionally quoted half-spreads 
2006 (SPREAD). Ask, bid, and closing prices are 
obtained from Datastream. VOLATILITY is the 
standard deviation of daily prices 2006 divided by 
the mean price 2006. Daily prices are taken from 
Datastream. 
4.3 Sample and Descriptive Results 
The hypotheses are evaluated using a sample that 
initially consists of all 600 German firms listed in 
the Prime and General Standard of the Deutsche 
Börse in 2006. I exclude foreign firms listed on the 
Deutsche Börse. Table 1 reports selected character-
istics of the initial sample. 
Table 1: Sample characteristics 
Panel A: Industry of sample firms 
industry number of firms in sample 
production (NACE groups 
A, B, C, D, E, F) 
264 
commerce (NACE group G) 33 
financial (NACE group J) 44 
services (NACE groups 
H, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q) 
259 
 600 
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Panel B: Size of sample firms 
total sales number of firms in sample* 
less than 107.5 € 159 
less than 108.0 € 109 
less than 108.5 € 119 
less than 109.0 € 68 
less than 109.5 € 51 
less than 1010 € 22 
less than 1010.5 € 17 
more than 1010.5 € 11 
 556 
* 44 missing values 
The effective sample size decreases considerably 
because of missing values. Particularly, I could only 
obtain English-language annual reports for 390 
firms. The effective sample size decreases further 
depending on availability of other measures in the 
Datastream and Hoppenstedt databases. I apply a 
list-wise deletion approach in order to retain a large 
proportion of the sample variance. Appendix B pro-
vides selected descriptive statistics for the sample. I 
address the delay in the availability of annual re-
ports by regressing disclosure measures for the 
annual report of 2005 that became available some-
time in 2006 with controls and a dependent variable 
for 2006.1 
Table 2: Multivariate regression of share turnover on disclosure 
Panel A: Robust regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE +  0.4546*** (5.12) 0.000 2.33 
FREEFLOAT +  0.0580* (1.82) 0.070 1.13 
SIZE ?  0.0564 (1.45) 0.147 2.36 
VOLATILITY +  0.0510 (1.52) 0.130 1.14 
EXCHANGE_SEGMENT –  0.0106 (0.45) 0.652 1.15 
CROSSLISTING +  0.4414*** (8.75) 0.000 1.19 
Condition Number  1 0.71    
N   348    
R2   0.6084    
Panel B: Robust rank regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE +  0.2253*** (3.81) 0.000 2.03 
FREEFLOAT +  0.3473*** (7.26) 0.000 1.12 
SIZE ?  0.0589 (0.99) 0.324 2.06 
VOLATILITY +  0.1295*** (3.01) 0.003 1.14 
EXCHANGE_SEGMENT – – 0.2562*** (–5.23) 0.000 1.17 
CROSSLISTING +  0.1687*** (5.95) 0.000 1.14 
Condition Number   9.79    
N   348    
R2   0.4456    
The table reports standardized coefficients, t-statistics, significance values (p), and variance inflation factors (VIF) from a linear and a 
ranked OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The dependent variable is the share turnover (SHARE_TURNOVER) 
2006 obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from the ten 
AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. FREEFLOAT is the percentage of shares not hold by strategic inves-
tors derived from the Deutsche Börse Weighting files 2006. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from the Hop-
penstedt Firmendatenbank. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices 
being obtained from Datastream. EXCHANGE_SEGMENT distinguishes between firms listed in the Prime (coding 1) and General 
Standard (coding 2). CROSSLISTING is the number of countries a firm is listed outside Germany based on the Datastream list of stock 
exchanges. All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
___________________ 
1 Raw data are available from the BuR – Business Research website. 
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5 Empirical Results 
This section reports the results of the hypotheses 
testing and the robustness analysis. 
 
5.1 Regression Results 
Table 2 reports the results for a multivariate regres-
sion of share turnover on disclosure with heterosce-
dasticity robust errors in panel A. To address poten-
tial non-linear relations between the dependent and 
independent variables, panel B also lists the results 
for a robust rank regression. The models do not 
provide evidence for multicollinearity. 
The signs of the controls are in line with expecta-
tions. A comparison of panels A and B reveals indi-
cations of a potential non-linearity between freefloat 
and trading activity that could result as the freefloat 
is constrained between 0 and 100 percent while the  
trading activity measure has no natural upper limit. 
Similarly nonlinearities might exist for the volatility 
and the exchange segment measure. All models 
congruently report a significant positive association 
between disclosure and trading activity and support 
H1. 
Table 3 reports the results for a heteroscedasticity 
robust multivariate regression of spreads on disclo-
sure in panel A. Again, panel B lists the results of 
robust rank regression to address potential non-
linear relations. There is no indication of severe 
multicollinearity. 
All models support the hypothesized negative asso-
ciation between disclosure and spread. With the 
exception of price volatility the controls are signifi-
cant and have the expected sign. Overall, the models 
support the inhibiting effect stated in H2. 
 
Table 3: Multivariate regression of bid-ask spread on disclosure 
Panel A: Robust regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE – – 0.1589*** (–3.08) 0.002 2.70 
FREEFLOAT – – 0.2219*** (–4.76) 0.000 1.07 
SIZE – – 0.5549*** (–10.04) 0.000 2.28 
SHARE_TURNOVER –  0.1181*** (3.71) 0.000 1.84 
VOLATILITY +  0.0463 (0.84) 0.399 1.15 
Condition Number   5.89    
N   354    
R2   0.4820    
Panel B: Robust rank regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE – – 0.1589*** (–3.08) 0.002 2.70 
FREEFLOAT – – 0.2219*** (–4.76) 0.000 1.07 
SIZE – – 0.5549*** (–10.04) 0.000 2.28 
SHARE_TURNOVER –  0.1181*** (3.71) 0.000 1.84 
VOLATILITY +  0.0463 (0.84) 0.399 1.15 
Condition Number   7.99    
N   354    
R2   0.6164    
The table reports standardized coefficients, t-statistics, significance values (p), and variance inflation factors (VIF) from a linear and a 
ranked OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The dependent variable (SPREAD) is the annual average of daily pro-
portionally quoted half-spreads 2006 obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above 
one) extracted from the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. FREEFLOAT is the percentage of shares not 
hold by strategic investors derived from the Deutsche Börse Weighting files 2006. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 ob-
tained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. SHARE_TURNOVER is the 2006 turnover in shares obtained from Datastream. VO-
LATILITY is the standard deviation of daily prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. 
All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Multivariate regression of abnormal returns on disclosure 
Panel A: Robust regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE – – 0.2504*** (–3.61) 0.000 2.08 
SIZE +  0.5772*** (9.43) 0.000 2.08 
Condition Number   1.01    
N   361    
R2   0.1875    
Panel B: Robust rank regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE – – 0.1538** (–2.47) 0.014 1.77 
SIZE +  0.5215*** (9.16) 0.000 1.77 
Condition Number   4.97    
N   361    
R2   0.1898    
The table reports standardized coefficients, t-statistics, significance values (p), and variance inflation factors (VIF) from a linear and a 
ranked OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The dependent variable (ABNORMAL_RETURN) is the 2006 annual 
average of daily abnormal stock returns against the industry average using four industry groups based on the NACE industry classifi-
cation obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from the ten 
AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from the 
Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of a robust multivariate 
regression of abnormal returns on disclosure in 
panel A and the results of a robust rank regression 
in panel B. There are no indications for multicollin-
earity. 
The models congruently support hypothesis H3 that 
disclosure and abnormal returns are negatively 
associated. 
Table 5 reports the results of a robust multivariate 
regression of market value on disclosure in panel A.  
Panel B again lists the results of a robust rank re-
gression to address potential nonlinear relations. 
The condition number for the model in panel A is at 
the lower end of the continuum between moderate 
and strong multicollinearity according to Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch (1980: 105) and therefore suggests 
a moderate multicollinearity problem. The alterna-
tive variance inflation factors do not indicate a se-
vere multicollinearity. The model in panel B does 
not show any indication of severe multicollinearity.
Table 5: Multivariate regression of market value on disclosure 
Panel A: Robust regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE +  0.1219*** (3.60) 0.000 2.31 
COMMON_EQUITY +  0.7241*** (15.38) 0.000 4.94 
SIZE ?  0.1342** (2.55) 0.011 5.08 
ABNORMAL_RETURN ? – 0.0428* (–1.84) 0.067 1.27 
Condition Number  4 4.65    
N   345    
R2   0.8539    
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Table 5 continued: Multivariate regression of market value on disclosure 
Panel B: Robust rank regression 
 Predicted Sign (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics p VIF 
DISCLOSURE +  0.1424*** (4.21) 0.000 1.88 
COMMON_EQUITY +  0.7139*** (14.09) 0.000 3.79 
SIZE ?  0.0990* (1.80) 0.073 4.12 
ABNORMAL_RETURN ? – 0.0128 (–0.43) 0.671 1.28 
Condition Number  1 1.31    
N   345    
R2   0.8029    
The table reports standardized coefficients, t-statistics, significance values (p), and variance inflation factors (VIF) from a linear and a 
ranked OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of market value 
(MARKET_VALUE) obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted 
from the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. COMMON_EQUITY is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total equity obtained from Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from the 
Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. ABNORMAL_RETURN is the 2006 annual average of daily abnormal stock returns against the in-
dustry average using four industry groups based on the NACE industry classification obtained from Datastream. All metric variables 
are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
It is not surprising to find a positive relation be-
tween market value and common equity. In addi-
tion, both models provide evidence for a positive 
association of disclosure and market value. In line 
with Abdolmohammadi (2005), no significant asso-
ciation between abnormal returns and market value 
could be found. Altogether, the results support H4 
that disclosure is value relevant. 
5.2 Robustness Analysis 
Various robustness tests have been conducted to 
find out if sampling issues or the particular model 
specifications affect the findings. 
I test the regression models from section 5.1 for a 
sample selection bias using the two-step methodol-
ogy of Heckman (1979). Here, the population is 
equivalent to all 600 listed firms. The samples con-
sists of the 345 to 361 firms that could be considered 
for the respective regression models. I use the ex-
change segment and the natural logarithm of total 
sales as determinants in the selection equation to 
address the fact that data might be more likely 
available for larger, Prime Standard firms. Lambda 
values for the share turnover and market value re-
gressions are insignificant indicating no sample 
selection problem. Lambda values are significant for 
the spread and the abnormal return regressions. For 
these models I apply a Heckman correction. The 
Heckman-corrected results (see Table A-3 in Ap-
pendix C) are structurally identical to the results 
shown in Tables 3 and 4 and support the significant 
negative association of disclosure and the respective 
dependent variables. Altogether, the Heckman 
analysis provides no evidence that the findings are 
affected by sample selection bias. 
To examine whether the models are robust against 
varying specifications I use various alternative de-
pendent and independent proxies. The factor ex-
tracted from the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD 
measures, the sum of the ten AIMDs and the sum of 
the natural logarithm of the ten AIMDs are used as 
alternative disclosure measures. I use total sales, the 
number of employees and total assets, and the natu-
ral logarithm of both as alternative size proxies. A 
binary variable if firms are crosslisted in the U.S. is 
used as an alternative proxy of crosslisting. Finally, I 
test if weekly and monthly averages of spreads and 
volatility as an alternative to daily averages affect 
the results. I found structurally identical results. 
Tables A-4 to A-7 in Appendix C provide the regres-
sion results of a selection of these alternative model 
specifications. 
6 Conclusion 
Corporate disclosure is discussed in the literature to 
have considerable capital market implications. In 
line with Healy and Palepu (2001) I examine market 
liquidity and capital cost implications of annual 
report disclosure for a sample of German firms 
listed on the Deutsche Börse. Different from other 
papers that rely on specific, narrow proxies for dis-
closure I derive disclosure measures from annual 
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reports using AIMD, a comprehensive, innovative 
computerized approach using artificial intelligence. 
The findings provide evidence that annual report 
disclosure positively affects market liquidity in the 
German capital market. Information disclosure 
changes market participants’ individual expecta-
tions which in turn require portfolio adjustments 
leading to trading activities. The friction that hin-
ders trading activities proxied by the bid-ask spread 
is also vulnerable to disclosure influences and the 
information and transaction-cost-based spread 
reduces with more information being disclosed. I 
also found that market liquidity benefits from the 
provision of additional information via disclosure in 
the German capital market in line with U.S. evi-
dence (e.g., Welker 1995, Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 
1999, Heflin, Shaw, and Wild 2005). 
Popular approaches to measure cost of capital, in-
cluding the CAPM and the APT, do not provide 
insights into a potential equity-cost-reducing effect 
of disclosure as they do not allow to model informa-
tion asymmetry reductions. Consequently, I found 
no association of the systematic risk (beta) and the 
level of annual report disclosure. This finding is 
contradictory to the influential Botosan (1997) anal-
ysis but in line with theory and in line with the em-
pirical studies of Auer (1998), De Alencar (2005), 
and Linsley and Shrives (2006). I found that inves-
tors’ return requirements proxied by ex-post ab-
normal returns are associated with a higher level of 
annual report disclosure for the German sample. In 
line with Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) this 
supports the view that capital cost reduction is a 
disclosure consequence within the Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) framework for the German capital 
market. 
The findings also support a capital-cost-reduction 
effect using market capitalization as an indirect 
measure of cost of capital. In line with e.g., Healy, 
Hutton, and Palepu (1999), Ritter and Welch 
(2002), and Linsley and Shrives (2006) I found that 
market value is positively associated with annual 
report disclosure. 
Using a sample of listed German firms the study 
supports the view that corporate disclosure in-
creases market liquidity and reduces cost of capital. 
It therefore does not reveal evidence that the infor-
mation processing at the German capital market 
might be structurally different from that on other 
capital markets. 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Artificial Intelligence 
Measurement of Disclosure (AIMD) 
The Artificial Intelligence Measure of Disclosure 
(AIMD) measures how informative a corporate text 
(e.g., annual report) is across ten information di-
mensions: 
1. sales-market and customer-related information, 
2. employee-related information, 
3. corporate environment information, 
4. financial information, 
5. corporate governance information, 
6. research-and-development-related information, 
7. social and environmental responsibility informa-
tion, 
8. capital-market-related information, 
9. corporate strategy information, and 
10. information relating to the value chain. 
AIMD differs from other disclosure measures with 
various respects. As described above it covers a 
broad understanding of disclosure, including non-
financial and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, 
AIMD extends word-count systems (e.g., Hussainey, 
Schleicher, and Walker 2003) by analysing more 
complex semantical units (“phrases”), and partly 
considers the grammatical structure of sentences. It 
does not require human interaction and judgement 
to derive disclosure measures from annual reports 
and therefore goes beyond current applications that 
only assist human beings in a manual coding proc-
ess (e.g., Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley 2004). 
Accordingly, AIMD is cost-effective and can be used 
with large samples. 
AIMD derives individual disclosure measures across 
the ten distinctive information dimensions listed 
above. As for most of these information dimensions 
it is not possible to discriminate between voluntary 
and mandatory disclosure (Cooke and Zeff 2007) 
AIMD does not distinguish between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. This does not weaken the ex-
planatory power of the results as a fixed, mandatory 
disclosure component will not affect the estimated 
coefficients except in the form of a constant. 
AIMD implements an information-retrieval vector 
space model (Salton, Wong, and Yang 1975) using 
artificial-intelligence (AI) techniques and consists of 
the two usual AI phases. First, in the training phase, 
a coding scheme is established based on a sample of 
annual reports. Second, in the application phase, 
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AIMD applies the coding scheme to a large number 
of new texts. 
Subsequently, some technical details are discussed. 
Grüning (2011) provided further documentation. 
AIMD measures disclosure based on the occurrence 
of certain N-grams, i.e. ordered sequences of N 
words. For example, “order backlog” is a bigram and 
“order backlog development” is a trigram. 
In the training phase, a coding scheme is created on 
the basis of a sample of representative annual re-
ports, attempting to classify and quantify the diver-
sity of corporate disclosures. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the coding scheme quickly converges 
and a training sample of 24 exemplary annual re-
ports is comprehensive and complete, i.e. covers all 
relevant aspects of corporate disclosure (Grüning 
2011). 
To reduce complexity and to improve applicability 
the different orthographical (e.g., “labor” vs. “la-
bour”) and grammatical forms (plural, conjugation, 
and word order within an N-gram) in the raw cod-
ing scheme are standardized to a morphological 
canonical form. 
Accordingly, the final coding scheme is independent 
of (1) stopwords without meaning (e.g., “and”, “or”), 
(2) the morphology of elements of N-grams and (3) 
permutations of the elements of N-grams. For ex-
ample, the standardized bigram “employee number” 
also represents the tetragram “number of the em-
ployees”. AIMD uses the stopword list of the Infor-
mation Retrieval Group of the University of Glasgow 
for the first step. For the grammatical and ortho-
graphical normalization in the second step it per-
forms a dictionary-based stemming process using 
the Automatically Generated Inflection Database 
(AGID) that contains 112,503 roots of 281,904 in-
flected forms and the Variant Conversion Info (Var-
Con) that lists spelling variants of 16,019 words. 
Following the morphological normalization, permu-
tations of the elements of an N-gram are standard-
ized. Different grammatical structures of the Eng-
lish language result in varying word orders within a 
sentence. When measuring the level of corporate 
disclosure only semantic differences are of impor-
tance. For instance, there is no relevant semantic 
difference between the N-grams “flexible arrange-
ment of the work time” and “an arrangement of 
flexible working time”. The final coding scheme 
comprises 13,314 standardized N-grams, covering 
about 1024 different semantic units relevant for cor-
porate disclosure. 
In the application phase AIMD applies the coding 
scheme from the training phase to a larger number 
of annual reports. Following Weber (1990) AIMD 
establishes a disclosure measure for each informa-
tion dimension using category counts. The entire 
application phase is automated using proprietary 
software written in C#. 
As it does not contain any random component the 
application phase of AIMD is perfectly reliable, 
being entirely objective. Grüning (2011) demon-
strated that AIMD has criterion validity and con-
struct validity based on large U.S. and German 
samples. Construct validity, i.e. the convergence of 
the results of different measurement techniques, is 
tested against several common disclosure proxies. 
The analysis reveals strong and highly significant 
correlations against the AIMR rating, Standard & 
Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Scoring, the 
ratings of the business magazines Manager Magazin 
and Capital/Focus Money as well as against firms’ 
disclosure self evaluations. AIMD also has criterion 
validity, i.e. can replicate theoretically predicted 
relations empirically, in the information asymmetry 
reduction proxied by the spread and the probability 
of information based trading (PIN) for a sample of 
about 13,700 and 11,600 U.S. firm-year observa-
tions, respectively. 
AIMD disclosure measures can be derived from 
different forms of disclosure, including an-
nual/quarterly reports, records from analysts’ meet-
ings, press news, conference calls, and corporate 
web pages. AIMD raw data is available from the 
author on request. 
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Table A-1 provides descriptive statistics for the de-
pendent and independent variables. The table lists 
the size of the available subsample, the mean, quan-
tiles including the median, and the standard devia-
tion. The disclosure level varies considerably be-
tween industries (not reported) with highest mean 
disclosure for financial and lowest for service firms. 
It also varies with the exchange segment with higher 
mean disclosure for Prime Standard firms. 
Table A-2 reports the correlation matrix between 
the variables. The correlations do not provide indi-
cations of multicollinearity problems. 
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Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Sub- 
sample 
Mean 0.25 Quan- 
tile 




DISCLOSURE_01 390 4,904  3,305  4,364  5,944  2,439 
DISCLOSURE_02 390 1,445  833  1,235  1,794  866 
DISCLOSURE_03 390 2,175  1,370  1,891  2,661  1,195 
DISCLOSURE_04 390 1,093  684  953  1,378  602 
DISCLOSURE_05 390 439  214  349  578  328 
DISCLOSURE_06 390 1,408  859  1,174  1,719  828 
DISCLOSURE_07 390 2,114  1,407  1,944  2,548  1,040 
DISCLOSURE_08 390 2,025  1,264  1,818  2,479  1,102 
DISCLOSURE_09 390 673  367  554  838  432 
DISCLOSURE_10 390 399  199  286  491  335 
DISCLOSURE 390 0.000 – 0.691 – 0.227  0.422  0.994 
ABNORMAL_RETURN 599 –0.000  0.003  0.011  0.026  0.122 
COMMON_EQUITY [mio €] 525 1,022  17  52  234  4,438 
CROSSLISTING 569 0.111   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.707 
EXCHANGE_SEGMENT 600 1.463  1.000  1.000  2.000  0.499 
FREEFLOAT 597 0.521  0.278  0.517  0.770  0.302 
MARKET_VALUE [mio €] 597 1,745  21  69  435  6,644 
SHARE_TURNOVER 590 65,041  1,351  5,119 1 9,045   319,306 
SIZE (total sales [mio €]) 556 2,407  27  115  484      11,061 
SIZE (employees) 596 8,981  140  578  2,772     38,543 
SIZE (total assets [mio €]) 569 7,499  40  131  548     65,853 
SPREAD 597 0.019  0.006  0.010  0.018  0.032 
VOLATILITY 599 0.144  0.077  0.113  0.171  0.115 
Table A-2: Correlation Matrix 
 (01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) (07) (08) (09) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(01) DISCLOSURE   0.24  0.67 0.28 –0.24 0.20 0.69 0.41 0.67 0.66 0.67 –0.62 –0.21 
(02) ABNORMAL_RETURN  0.22   0.35 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.34 –0.03 0.47 0.46 0.41 –0.29 –0.17 
(03) COMMON_EQUITY  0.59  0.11  0.33 –0.14 0.14 0.88 0.34 0.85 0.78 0.92 –0.77 –0.34 
(04) CROSSLISTING  0.36  0.13  0.57  –0.10 0.18 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 –0.32 –0.14 
(05) EXCHANGE_SEGMENT – 0.22  0.13 – 0.07 –0.08  –0.25 –0.14 –0.39 –0.04 –0.01 –0.05 0.18 0.05 
(06) FREEFLOAT  0.20  0.02  0.13 0.16 –0.29  0.09 0.48 0.14 0.10 0.15 –0.31 0.02 
(07) MARKET_VALUE  0.62  0.11  0.89 0.63 –0.07 0.12  0.39 0.80 0.71 0.87 –0.83 –0.29 
(08) SHARE_TURNOVER  0.52 – 0.00  0.76 0.31 –0.09 0.13 0.71  0.30 0.24 0.34 –0.46 0.03 
(09) SIZE (total sales)  0.58  0.16  0.86 0.61 –0.06 0.11 0.78 0.56  0.92 0.91 –0.72 –0.34 
(10) SIZE (employees)  0.59  0.17  0.76 0.58 –0.08 0.12 0.74 0.58 0.91  0.82 –0.65 –0.36 
(11) SIZE (total assets)  0.58  0.13  0.93 0.60 –0.06 0.11 0.83 0.66 0.95 0.83  –0.75 –0.30 
(12) SPREAD – 0.53 – 0.23 – 0.27 –0.21 0.21 –0.31 –0.31 –0.22 –0.29 –0.29 –0.27  0.23 
(13) VOLATILITY – 0.23 – 0.25 – 0.13 –0.09 0.01 0.06 –0.16 –0.09 –0.13 –0.13 –0.12 0.25  
The table lists in the lower left triangle Pearson correlations and in the upper-right triangle Spearman correlations. 
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Appendix C: Results of the Robustness 
Analysis 
This appendix provides results of the robustness 
analysis described in section 5.2. Table A-3 reports 
the Heckman-corrected results for the spread and 
abnormal return regressions that might potentially 
be affected by a sample selection error because of 
the significant lambda values. The Heckman-
corrected results are structurally identical to the 
results shown in Tables 3 and 4 and therefore pro-
vide no evidence for a sample selection bias. 
Table A-4 reports results for selected alternative 
specifications of the share turnover regression from 
Table 2. The first column repeats the results of Pan-
el A in Table 2 to allow a convenient comparison. I 
also examined non-logarithmic size measures and 
combinations of alternative measures. The results of 
these additional 135 regression models and the 143 
rank regression models are not reported here but 
can be replicated using the publically available data-
set. The results suggest that the share turnover in-
crease with disclosure is robust. 
Table A-3: Heckman-corrected multivariate regressions 
Panel A: Multivariate regression of bid-ask spread on disclosure 
 (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics 
DISCLOSURE – 0.0372* (–1.91) 
FREEFLOAT – 0.0649*** (–4.83) 
SIZE – 0.1701*** (–9.55) 
SHARE_TURNOVER  0.0273** (2.06) 
VOLATILITY  0.0157 (1.13) 
   
EXCHANGE_SEGMENT – 2.4778*** (–14.63) 
SIZE  0.6441*** (3.71) 
LAMBDA  0.002*** (3.39) 
N  555  
Panel B: Multivariate regression of abnormal return on disclosure 
 (Standardized) Coefficient t-Statistics 
DISCLOSURE – 0.2012*** (–2.98) 
SIZE  0.5840*** (8.70) 
   
EXCHANGE_SEGMENT – 2.7695*** (–13.68) 
SIZE  0.8247*** (4.29) 
LAMBDA  0.005*** (3.66) 
N  555  
The table reports standardized coefficients (except of LAMBDA where a non-standardized coefficient is reported) and t-statistics from 
linear OLS regressions using a Heckman selection model with two-step consistent estimates. Panel A reports results for the Heckman-
corrected regression from Panel A of Table 3; Panel B reports results for the Heckman-corrected regression from Panel A of Table 4. 
The dependent variable in Panel A (SPREAD) is the annual average of daily proportionally quoted half-spreads 2006 obtained from 
Datastream. The dependent variable in Panel B (ABNORMAL_RETURN) is the 2006 annual average of daily abnormal stock returns 
against the industry average using four industry groups based on the NACE industry classification obtained from Datastream. DIS-
CLOSURE is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived 
from annual reports of 2005. FREEFLOAT is the percentage of shares not hold by strategic investors derived from the Deutsche Börse 
Weighting files 2006. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. 
SHARE_TURNOVER is the 2006 turnover in shares obtained from Datastream. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily prices 
2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. EXCHANGE_SEGMENT distinguishes between 
firms listed in the Prime (coding 1) and General Standard (coding 2). All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both ex-
tremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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DISCLOSURE_1  0.4546***     0.4150***  0.3317***  0.4343***  0.4543***  0.4543*** 
DISCLOSURE_2   0.2101***        
DISCLOSURE_3    0.4457***       
DISCLOSURE_4     0.2053***      
FREEFLOAT  0.0580*  0.0774**  0.0610*  0.0760**  0.0681*  0.0738*  0.0548*  0.0599*  0.0585* 
SIZE_1  0.0564  0.2213***  0.0688*  0.2281***    0.1053***  0.0561  0.0558 
SIZE_2      0.0687     
SIZE_3       0.1686***    
VOLATILITY_1  0.0510  0.0480  0.0492  0.0474  0.0471  0.0619**  0.0619*   
VOLATILITY_2         0.0487  
VOLATILITY_3          0.0499 
EXCHANGE_SEGMENT  0.0106 – 0.0166  0.0135 – 0.0169 – 0.0173 – 0.0337 – 0.0022  0.0108  0.0111 
CROSSLISTING_1  0.4414***  0.4827***  0.4435***  0.4796***  0.4671***  0.4695***   0.4420***  0.4415*** 
CROSSLISTING_2        0.4290***   
N  348  348  348  348  376  372  355  346  346 
R2  0.6084  0.5406  0.6094  0.5402  0.6190  0.6451  0.6150  0.6080  0.6081 
The table reports standardized coefficients from linear OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The results for the original model are also reported in Panel A of Table 2. The 
dependent variable is the share turnover (SHARE_TURNOVER) 2006 obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE_1 is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from 
the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_2 is the factor (KMO 0.935; one eigenvalue of 8.216 above one) extracted from 
the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_3 is the unweighted sum of the ten AIMD disclosure 
measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_4 is the unweighted sum of the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from 
annual reports of 2005. FREEFLOAT is the percentage of shares not hold by strategic investors derived from the Deutsche Börse Weighting files 2006. SIZE_1 is the natural logarithm of total 
sales 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. The alternative measure SIZE_2 is the natural logarithm of the number of group employees 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt 
Firmendatenbank. The alternative measure SIZE_3 is the natural logarithm of total assets 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. VOLATILITY_1 is the standard deviation of 
daily prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. The alternative VOLATILITY_2 is the standard deviation of monthly prices 2006 divided by the 
mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. The alternative VOLATILITY_3 is the standard deviation of weekly prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being 
obtained from Datastream. EXCHANGE_SEGMENT distinguishes between firms listed in the Prime (coding 1) and General Standard (coding 2). CROSSLISTING_1 is the number of countries a 
firm is listed outside Germany based on the Datastream list of stock exchanges. The alternative CROSSLISTING_2 equals 1 if the firm is crosslisted in the U.S. and 0 otherwise. All metric vari-
ables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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DISCLOSURE_1 – 0.1589***    – 0.2971*** – 0.2630** – 0.1557*** – 0.1542*** – 0.1578*** – 0.1624*** 
DISCLOSURE_2  – 0.1490***         
DISCLOSURE_3   – 0.1420***        
DISCLOSURE_4    – 0.1831***       
FREEFLOAT – 0.2219*** – 0.2218*** – 0.2234*** – 0.2186*** – 0.2206*** – 0.2463*** – 0.2227*** – 0.2255*** – 0.2464*** – 0.2459*** 
SIZE_1 – 0.5549*** – 0.5594*** – 0.5661*** – 0.5327***   – 0.5632*** – 0.5578*** – 0.5028*** – 0.5072*** 
SIZE_2     – 0.3749***      
SIZE_3      – 0.4353***     
SHARE_TURNOVER  0.1181***  0.0866***  0.1128***  0.0943***  0.0990***  0.1500***  0.1210***  0.1188***  0.1170***  0.1057*** 
VOLATILITY_1  0.0463  0.0490  0.0472  0.0490  0.0686  0.0738    0.0579  0.0446 
VOLATILITY_2        0.0323    
VOLATILITY_3         0.0496   
N  354  354  354  354  382  376  352  352  353  353 
R2  0.4820  0.4836  0.4805  0.4896  0.4178  0.4241  0.4821  0.4833  0.4356  0.4468 
The table reports standardized coefficients from linear OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The results for the original model are also reported in Panel A of Table 3. The 
dependent variable of the original model and alternatives 1 to 7 is the annual average of daily proportionally quoted half-spreads 2006 obtained from Datastream. The dependent variable of 
alternative 8 is the annual average of monthly proportionally quoted half-spreads 2006 obtained from Datastream. The dependent variable of alternative 9 is the annual average of weekly 
proportionally quoted half-spreads 2006 obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE_1 is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from the ten AIMD disclosure 
measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_2 is the factor (KMO 0.935; one eigenvalue of 8.216 above one) extracted from the natural logarithm of 
the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_3 is the unweighted sum of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from 
annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_4 is the unweighted sum of the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. 
FREEFLOAT is the percentage of shares not hold by strategic investors derived from the Deutsche Börse Weighting files 2006. SIZE_1 is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from 
the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. The alternative measure SIZE_2 is the natural logarithm of the number of group employees 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. The 
alternative measure SIZE_3 is the natural logarithm of total assets 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. SHARE_TURNOVER is the 2006 turnover in shares obtained from 
Datastream. VOLATILITY_1 is the standard deviation of daily prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. The alternative VOLATILITY_2 is the 
standard deviation of monthly prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. The alternative VOLATILITY_3 is the standard deviation of weekly 
prices 2006 divided by the mean price 2006 with prices being obtained from Datastream. All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A-5 reports results for selected alternative 
specifications of the spread regression from Table 3. 
Again, the first column repeats the results of Panel A 
in Table 3 to allow a convenient comparison. Non-
logarithmic size measures and combinations of 
alternative measures have also been examined. In 
line with the share turnover regression the results of 
these additional 368 regression models and the 377 
alternative rank regression models are not reported 
here. The publically available dataset allows to repli-
cate these regressions. The results provide evidence 
that the spread-reducing effect of disclosure is ro-
bust against particular specifications of the model. 
Table A-6 reports results for selected alternative 
specifications of the abnormal return regression 
from Table 4. Similar to the previous analyses the 
first column repeats the results of Panel A in Table 4 
to allow a convenient comparison. Results for addi-
tional 18 regression models that consider non-
logarithmic size measures and combinations of 
alternative measures and 24 alternative rank regres-
sion models are not reported here. They can be eas-
ily replicated using the publically available dataset. 
Altogether, the results suggest that the negative 
association of disclosure and abnormal returns is 
robust against particular model specifications. 
Table A-7 reports results for selected alternative 
specifications of the market value regression from 
Table 5. The first column again repeats the results of 
Panel A in Table 5 to allow a convenient compari-
son. I also considered non-logarithmic size meas-
ures and combinations of alternative measures. The 
results of these additional 18 regression models and 
the 24 alternative rank regression models are not 
reported as they can be easily replicated using the 
publically available dataset. The robustness analysis 
provides evidence that the positive association of 
market value and disclosure is robust against the 
particular model specification. 













DISCLOSURE_1 – 0.2504***    – 0.3157*** – 0.0543 
DISCLOSURE_2  – 0.1642***     
DISCLOSURE_3   – 0.2571***    
DISCLOSURE_4    – 0.1398***   
SIZE_1  0.5772***  0.5088***  0.5780***  0.4905***   
SIZE_2      0.5388***  
SIZE_3       0.2071** 
N  361  361  361  361  389  381 
R2  0.1875  0.1717  0.1906  0.1681  0.1527  0.0293 
The table reports standardized coefficients from linear OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The results for the origi-
nal model are also reported in Panel A of Table 4. The dependent variable (ABNORMAL_RETURN) is the 2006 annual average of daily 
abnormal stock returns against the industry average using four industry groups based on the NACE industry classification obtained from 
Datastream. DISCLOSURE_1 is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from the ten AIMD disclosure 
measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_2 is the factor (KMO 0.935; one eigenvalue of 
8.216 above one) extracted from the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The 
alternative measure DISCLOSURE_3 is the unweighted sum of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. 
The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_4 is the unweighted sum of the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived 
from annual reports of 2005. SIZE_1 is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. The 
alternative measure SIZE_2 is the natural logarithm of the number of group employees 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmen-
datenbank. The alternative measure SIZE_3 is the natural logarithm of total assets 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendaten-
bank. All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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DISCLOSURE_1  0.1219***     0.1265***  0.1171*** 
DISCLOSURE_2   0.1062***     
DISCLOSURE_3    0.1105***    
DISCLOSURE_4     0.1136***   
COMMON_EQUITY  0.1342**  0.1365***  0.1386***  0.1402***   
SIZE_1      0.0219  
SIZE_2       0.2094*** 
SIZE_3  0.7241***  0.7408***  0.7302***  0.7330***  0.8198***  0.6455*** 
ABNORMAL_RETURN – 0.0428* – 0.0467** – 0.0426* – 0.0478** – 0.0244 – 0.0191 
N  345  345  345  345  371  372 
R2  0.8539  0.8532  0.8530  0.8541  0.8686  0.8730 
The table reports standardized coefficients from linear OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected errors. The results for the origi-
nal model are also reported in Panel A of Table 5. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of market value (MARKET_VALUE) 
obtained from Datastream. DISCLOSURE_1 is the factor (KMO 0.928; one eigenvalue of 8.123 above one) extracted from the ten AIMD 
disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_2 is the factor (KMO 0.935; one eigen-
value of 8.216 above one) extracted from the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports of 
2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_3 is the unweighted sum of the ten AIMD disclosure measures derived from annual reports 
of 2005. The alternative measure DISCLOSURE_4 is the unweighted sum of the natural logarithm of the ten AIMD disclosure measures 
derived from annual reports of 2005. COMMON_EQUITY is the natural logarithm of the book value of total equity obtained from Hop-
penstedt Firmendatenbank. SIZE_1 is the natural logarithm of total sales 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank. The 
alternative measure SIZE_2 is the natural logarithm of the number of group employees 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmen-
datenbank. The alternative measure SIZE_3 is the natural logarithm of total assets 2006 obtained from the Hoppenstedt Firmendaten-
bank. ABNORMAL_RETURN is the 2006 annual average of daily abnormal stock returns against the industry average using four indus-
try groups based on the NACE industry classification obtained from Datastream. All metric variables are winsorized at the 0.02 level at 
both extremes to adjust for potential outliers. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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